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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.
PROFESSORS CHESTER G. AVERNIER AND ELMER A. WILCOX.
ABAND0N !ENT OF CHILD.
Phelps v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 524. Statute of Limitations. -De-
fendant had abandoned his child some four or five years before the beginning
of the prosecuticn and had not since contributed to its support. The period of
limitation was two years. A prior decision of the Supreme Court held that a
conviction of abandonment was a bar to a prosecution for a continuance of the
same abandonment. Held, that the crime consists of two elements: Separation
from the child, and failureoto supply its needs. The continuance of the latter
element keeps the offense alive, though it began and the separation occurred
more than two years before the prosecution was begun. The dinstinction be-
tween this and the prior decision seems to be that in that case the defendant,
having been convicted of both elements, could not be again put in jeopardy
upon the original separation, and the continued failure to support, without a
new separation, was not made criminal by the statute.
ALIENS.
It re Ross, 188 Fed. 685. Naturalization. Where an alien, applying for
admission to citizenship, has not behaved as a man of good moral character
while residing in the United States, the court, in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, will refuse his petition, though his behavior has been good during the
five years preceding the petition.
An alien, pleading guilty to murder in the second degree, will not be ad-
mitted to citizenship, though before the offense and for more than five years
after the expiration of the term of imprisonment, his conduct reveals no cause
for censure.
APPEAL
Hoffnan v. State, Ind., 95 N. E. oo2. Technical Errors. Alleged technical
errors relating to the evidence and instructions in a criminal prosecution for
rape are not ground for reversal, where they could not have affected the result.
ARRAIGNMENT.
State v. Drown, Vt., 8I Atl. 641. Waiver. P. S. 2264 provides that in all
criminal cases, where the party indicted on being arraigned, shall refuse to plead,
it amounts to a denial of the facts charged in the indictment, and the same
judgment after trial shall be given against him as if he had pleaded in proper
form. Held, that accused, in a prosecution for rape, could not waive arraign-
ment, and, having been placed on trial without having been arraigned, his con-
viction was void. -
ARREST.
. Robertson v. Territory of Arizona, 188 Fed. 783. Rights of Officer. In-
structions, on the trial of a peace officer charged with homicide committed
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while attempting to arrest the deceased for a misdcmeanor, considered, and,
taken as whole, -held to correctly charge that, while the defendant did not have
the right to kill deceased for attempting merely to avoid arrest by running
away, he had the right to overcome actual resistance to arrest by such force as
was necessary, even to the taking of life.
BIGAMY.
People v. Dauchy, 131 N. Y. Supp. 993. Knowledge of Death of First
Wife. Under Penal Law, Sec. 341, Subd. I, providing that one shall not be
guilty of bigamy whose former wife has been absent for five years successively,
then last past, when the second marriage is consummated, without being known
to the husband within that time to be living and believed by him to be dead, a
man was not guilty" of bigamy if his first wife was absent for five years imme-
diately preceding his second marriage, without his knowledge that she was alive
within that time, and he believed at the time of the second marriage that she was
dead, even though he may have believed that she was living at some time within
the five-year period.
BURGLARY.
Martin v. State, Ind., 95 N. E. lool. Venue. Bill of Rights, Sec. 13, pro-
vides that accused shall have a public trial in the county in which the offense
shall have been committed. Burns Ann. Stat. 9o8, Sec. 1867, declares that
every criminal action shall be publicly tried in the county in which the offense
was committed, except as otherwise provided in the act; and Sec. 1875 provides
that when proberty taken in one county by burglary, robbery, larceny or embez-
zlement has been brought into another county the jurisdiction is in either
county. Held, that Sec. 1875 haal reference only to the offense of bringing stolen
property from one county into another, and did not authorize the prosecution of
accused for burglary in a county other than that where the burglary was com-
mitted, by reason of the fact that he subsequently brought some of the stolen
property into such other county.
CONSPIRACY.
United States v. Stone, 188 Fed. 836. Deprivation of Right to Vote. Pen.
Code, Par. ig. (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. I9O2), punishing persons con-
spiring to injure any citizen in the free exercise of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Federal Constitution or laws, covers a conspiracy to deprive a
citizen of his right to vote at a congressional election and thereby injure him,
within the ordinary meaning of the word injure, and a. conspiracy to deprive
illiterate negro voters of their right to vote by preparing the ballot in such a
way as to make it difficult to vote for their candidate for Congress is punishable.
CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW.
State v. Broadway, N. Car., 72 S. E. 987. Ex Post Facto Law. A statute
providing.for the punishment of incest by imprisonment "for a term not ex-
ceeding five years," was amended by striking out the words "five years" and
inserting the words "fifteen years," the amendment to take effect from its rati-
fication. After the ratification defendant was indicted for incest committed be-
fore that time. Held, that repeals by implication are not favored by law. The
legislature had simply added ten years to the maximum punishment of future
S)0
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offenses, and had left the prior statute still in force as to offenses already com-
mitted. Hence the conviction and sentence to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years was affirmed.
Strickland v. State, Ga., 72 S. E. 26o. Right to Bear Arms. A statute
prohibiting having or carrying any pistol or revolver without first having ob-
tained a license from the ordinary of the county, for which a fee of fifty cents
is charged, does not violate the provision in the state constitution that the right
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembl " shall
have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne, as that pro-
vision relates to military arms, and the express power to regulate is given. It
does not violate the like provision in the Constitution of the United States, as
that prohibition is limited to Congress and does not apply to the states.
EMBEZZLEMENT.
People v. Goodrich, Ill., 96 N. E. 542. Where accused, who was agent for
the prosecuting witness, brought her a large sum of money, which she placed in
a safety deposit box, and the evidence tended to show that she owed accused a
small sum and expected to pay him out of the money in the deposit box, but
did not wish to pay then, accused, who had access to the box, and embezzled
the money therein, was not a joint owner with the prosecuting witness, and an
instruction that if the jury believed he was such a joint owner there could be
no conviction was properly refused.
EVIDENCE.
Darby v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 182. Dying Declarations. A state-
ment as to the cause of his death and who killed him, made by the victim of a
homicide after he was wounded and "when he was conscious that 'he would
die" and "was aware of his approaching death" is not admissible as a dying
declaration unless he was at the time in a dying condition, "in the article of
death."
State v. Brumo, Ia., 132 N. W. 817. Deceased, who had received a mortal
wound, fully realized his condition and was conscious that death could not be
long delayed, made a declaration stating what had taken place when he was
wounded. He died from the wound nineteen days later. He continued to be-
lieve that he would die from the effects of the wound. Held, that his state-
ment was rightly received as a dying declaration.
State v. Stumbaugh, S. Dak., 132 N. W. 666. Photographs. On a trial for
murder, a photograph showing the location of the parties at the time of the
shooting, was received in evidence, over the objection that the photograph was
taken after the tragedy, and that there had been some change made at the
place in the intervening time. It appeared that the change was so slight as
not materially to affect the value of the photograph as indicating the position of
the parties, the location of the fence, and the topography of the ground. Held,
that the admission or rejection of photographs is largely within the discretion
of the trial court. There should be no reversal unless there has been a manifest
abuse of this discretion. No such abuse appearing here the conviction was
affirmed.
State v. Leak, N. Car., 72 S. E. 567. Harmless Error. A witness was
asked if the defendant was "considered bright," and if he did not have the
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reputation "of not being strong-minded." Objections to both questions were
sustained. As there was nothing to indicate what was expected to be proved, or
what answer would have been given to the questions, it did not appear that the
defendant was purejudiced by the rulings. Hence the conviction was affirmed.
McKay v. State,*Neb., 132 N. W. 741. Bloodstained Garments. On a trial
for murder, the bloodstained garments of the deceased were admitted in evi-
dence. It was conceded that a murder had been committed, and the only ques-
tion was, whether the defendant committed it, Held, that as the garments
could in no manner identify, or tend to identify, the prisoner as the murderer,
and their introduction could only excite the passions and inflame the minds of
the jurors, it was error to admit them. For this and other reasons the con-
viction was reversed.
FuGITvE FROM JusTicE.
Southerland v. State, Ind., 96 N. E. 583. Right to Appeal or Object to
Iidictment. One, while a fugitive from justice, cannot test the sufficiency of an
indictment or information for a felony, or prosecute an appeal.
HABEAS CoRPuS.
State v. Floyd, N. Dak., 132 N. W. 662. Not Remedy for Error. On tho
trial of an information for robbery, in the absence of the defendant, who was
in jail, and of his counsel, and without the consent of either, the jury came into
court, reported that they were unable to agree, and were discharged. The de-
fendant then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that even if the act
of the court was erroneous, which was expressly not decided, the court did not
lose jurisdiction over the case, hence the writ should be quashed. The error,
if any, should be attacked by a plea of former jeopardy at the new trial.
INDICTMENT.
People v. Peck, N. Y., 13o N. Y. Supp. 967. Materiality of Evidence. An
indictment for perjury committed during an examination of accused in a pro-
ceeding by the superintendent of insurance, relating to the 'affairs of the insur-
ance company of which he was an officer, alleged that it became material in
such inquiry whether a contract between accused and the corporation, requiring
it to pay him three cents for each quarterly capita tax paid by every member,
and one-half cent from each monthly rate payment on certificates issued, was
a liability of the corporation, whether the contract was valuable and was bind-
ing and a legal clafm against it, and whether the corporation owed defendant
thereunder, and that defendant falsely and wilfully testified that he "thought"
the contract was a liability of the corporation, and "believed" that it was bind-
ing upon it and was valuable, and that he "considered" that the corporation
owed him thereunder, when accused well knew that the facts were contrary to
his statement of what he thought, believed, or considered them to be. Held,
that the indictment did not show false testimony as to a material question of
fact, the validity and existence of the contract being questions of law upon
which accused's opinion could not be material, and hence the indictment was
insufficient.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
McKay v. State, Neb., 132 N. W. 74r.. Effect of Amendment. An informa-
tion filed April 28, 19io, charged the defendant with the commission of a mur-
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der on December 7, I9IO. After the trial began, on defendant's objecting to the
introduction of evidence because of the date alleged, the county attorney was
permitted to amend, by substituting igog for igio. Defendant objected to going
to trial without having twenty-four hours after the service of the amended in-
formation in which to plead to it. His objection was overruled. A statute
provided that no one should be arraigned or called on to answer any indictment
until one day after the receipt of it. Held, that the information as first drawn
was fatally defective; the amendment was properly allowed; but the court erred
in forcing the defendant to immediately proceed with the trial, without arraign-
ment under and plea to the only informatibn filed which slated an offense, with-
out giving him the statutory time in which the plead thereto, and before a jury
which had been impaneled under the former void information. The conviction
was reversed.
State v. Francis, N. Car., 72 S. E. lO41. Defects Cured by Verdict. To
arrest the judgment, an indictment must be so defective that judgment can
not be pronounced upon it. Hence- judgment will not be arrested, because
neither the county in which the indictment was found nor the term of court
appear in the caption; nor because the time at which the offense was com-
mitted is not stated, time not being an essential part of the offense charged;
nor because the state failed to show that the offense was committed within the
period not covered by the statute of limitations, as failure to make such proof
should be taken advantage of by a request for an instruction. The county ap-
peared in neither the caption nor the body of the indictment.
Bright v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 519. Description of Property. An
indictment charged larceny of "the personal goods of W. T. Lockett then and
there being found, to-wit: ioo pounds of seed cotton, of the value of $io." On
special demurrer, assigning as ground that the property was not described with
sufficient definiteness and particularity, it was held that the particular property
alleged to have been stolen must have been described. "The marks, quality or
kind of the property must be incorporated in the description, or the transaction
in some way individualized. Merely to charge the defendant with having
stolen 'seed cotton' without even saying whether it is long or short staple, or
without in any way informing him of the locality from which it is claimed he
stole the cotton, is too vague, general, and indefinite to withstand a timely special
demurrer."
State v. Lewis, W. Va., 72 S. E. 475. Bill of Particulars. Defendant was
indicted for larceny. At his request the court ordered the state to furnish a
bill of particulars. The state refused to do so, defendant was .tried on the
indictment and convicted on proof that he had knowingly received stolen goods.
By judicial construction of the West Virginia statutes there can be a conviction
on an ordinary indictment for larceny, on proof of larceny, receiving stolen
goods, obtaining goods under false pretenses, or embezzlement. The statute
providing for bills of particulars possibly applied to civil actions only. Held,
that even though the statute did not apply to criminal prosecutions, the consti-
tutional provision that "the accused be fully and plainly informed of the char-
acter and cause of the accusation" gave the court discretionary power to order
such a bill to be furnished. Conviction reversed.
People v. Gray, Ill., 96 N. E. 268. Variance-Name of Prosecutris. An
indictment for rape on an illegitimate child, whose mother married when the
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child was three years old, which gives as the surname of the child the sur-
name of the husband of the mother, is sufficiently supported by proof that after
the marriage the child was generally known by such name; a bastard not neces-
sarily bearing its mother's name; a "name" being one or more words to desig-
nate a person or thing.
People v. Burke, 131 N. Y. Supp. 122. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss.
Accused was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury. and was cautioned
that anything he said might be used against him. The only evidence connect-
ing him with several forgeries which was inquired into was his own testimony.
Held, that a motiqn to dismiss the indictment found against him for such
forgeries, on the ground that his constitutional rights were invaded, will be
denied.
People v. Castaldo, 31 N. Y. Supp. 545. Varlance-Materiality. Pen.
Code, Sec. 217, makes it an offense to make an assault with intent to kill or to
commit a felony upon the person of the one assaulted or of "another," etc. Code
Crim. Proc., Sec. 281, provides that, when an offense involves commission of a
private injury and is described sufficiently to identify the act, an errorleous alle-
gation as to the person intended to be injured is not, material; Code Cr. Proc.,
Sec. 542, requires an Appellate Court to give judgment regardless of defects
not affecting substantial rights, and Secs. 293-295 authorize the cure of imma-
terial variances by amendment on the trial. Held, that there was no fatal
variance between a charge that accused assaulted B with intent to kill him, and
proof that the assault was made with intent to kill.G, though no amendment was
attempted.
INSANITY.
'Commonwealth v. Lee, Pa., 81 Atl. 812. Burden of Proof. To establish
the defense of insanity, the evidence must so preponderate in favor of insanity
as to overbalance the presumption and proof of sanity.
INSTRUCTIONS.
People v. Hubert, Ill., 96 N. E. 294. Harmless Error. Though the instruc-
tion that the question the jury had to determine was simply one of fact, the
guilt or innocence of defendant, is inaccurate, the question of guilt or inno-
cence being one of mixed law and fact, and, the jury being judges of the law
as well as the facts, it is harmless.
Hudgins v. State, Ga., 71 S. E. io65. Harmless Error. Defendant ap-
pealed from a conviction of murder. The trial judge had instructed the jury
that if they had a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of murder they should
acquit him, notwithstanding they might consider that,.under some view of the
evidence and the law, he might be guilty of some lesser grade of homicide.
Held, that while this was inaccurate, yet in view of the evidence, the state-
ment of the accused and the entire charge of the court, the inaccuracy was not
sufficient to require the granting of a new trial.
Morse v. State, Ga. Ct. App., 72 S. E. 534. "Autoptic Proferece." In a
trial certain bottles and their contents were introduced in evidence and given to
the jury for their consideration. The judge instructed with reference to them
that "evidence may be autoptic proference." This charge was objected to as
(I) abstractly incorrect; and (2) misleading. The court said, "Considering
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these points in reverse order, we may say (to borrow a Hibernicism from the
private vocabulary of an ex-justice of the Supreme Court of this state) that
the language excepted to is neither leading nor misleading. As to the other
objection-that the language is abstractly incorrect-if incorrectness from a
legal standpoint is intended, the objection may be disposed of by citing Wig-
more on Evidence, Sec. n15o et seq. If philological incorrectness is referred to,
the objection is more tenable; for, while 'autoptic' is a good word, with pride
of ancestry, though perhaps without hope of posterity, the word 'proference' is
a glossological illegitimate, a neological love-child, of which a great law writer
confesses himself to be the father (see Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. I 5O, note
I). Despite all this, we cannot brand the statement as reversible error. This
court is rather liberal in allowing the judges on the trial benches the privilege
of big words. * * * * Following Wigmore, Judge Felton used this ex-
pression, and then most clearly explained, and illustrated to the jury, in plain,
simple, homely language, just what the big words mean." It does not appear
whether the jury wished to have the "autoptic proference" refilled.
Luery v. State, Md., 8i AtI. 681. Court Not Bound to Charge fury in
Criminal Cases. Inasmuch as the courts do not charge juries in criminal cases,
the jury being made judges of the law and of facts, the trial court might well
adopt the practice of granting prayers, advising juries against conviction on
testimony of accomplice, without corroboration, although there is no -statute in
the state requiring corroboration.
State v. Carlisle, S. Dak., 132 N. W. 686. On Dcfendant's Failure to Tes-
tify. The court, of its own motion, charged the jury that the fact that the
defendant had not testified should raise no presumption against him. Held, that
this reference to the fact did not violate the statute providing that failure to
testify should raise no presumption against the defendant, distinguishing cases
in which the prosecuting attorney had referred to the failure to testify. One
judge dissented.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE.
Manor v. City of Bainbridge, Ga., 71 S. E. 11oI. Reasonableness. Under
the general welfare clause a city may by ordinance penalize the sale of what
is commonly known as "near beer" within the city limits. It may except a
prescribed portion of the city from the operation of the ordinance if the ex-
ception is reasonable. The fact that when the ordinance was passed, and when
the application for an injunction to restrain its enforcement was heard, every
building in the excepted tract suitable for the sale of "near beer" was occu-
pied and plaintiff could not get a building in which to carry on the business in
that tract at a reasonable price, does not make the exception unreasonable.
The fact that for two years before the passage of the ordinance the plaintiff
had been engaged in the sale of "near beer," outside the excepted tract, under
a city license, and had made valuable improvements at that place for the pur-
pose of continuing the business does not invalidate the ordinance.
POLICE POWER.
State v. Boone, Ohio, 95 N. E. 924. Constitutionality of Compulsory Re-
port of Vital Statistics. Secs. 14, 17, 21, of an "Act to establish a bureau of
vital statistics and to provide for the prompt and permanent registration of all
births and deaths occurring within the state of Ohio" (99 0. L.'296), so far
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- as they relate to a physician or midwife, in attendance upon a case of confine-
ment, are unconstitutional and void, because they were enacted by an unnec-
essary, unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power.
RAPE.
People v. Trumbley, Ill., 96 N. E. 573. Woman as Principal. -A woman
may be convicted of aiding and abetting in a commission of rape, and hence,
under the statute abolishing all distinction between principal and accessories,
could be indicted as principal.
SENTENCE.
People v. Coleman, Ill., 96 N. E. 239. Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hurd's
Rev. St. 199o, C. 38, Sec. 498, provides that every male person over 21, who
shall be convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,
except treason, murder, rape and kidnapping, shall be sentenced to the peni-
tentiary for not less than one year, nor more than the maximum term pro-
vided by law for the crime of which the prisoner is convicted, making allow-
ance for good time. Held, that where defendants were indicted for murder and
were found guilty of manslaughter, it was error for the court to sentence them
to a fixed term of imprisonment: they being entitled to an indeterminate
sentence.
But where no reversible error occurred in the proceedings of the trial
prior to verdict, and reversible error intervened thereafter, the cause should be
remanded for resentence only.
Ex-parte Hinson, N. Car., 72 S, E. 310. Suspension of Execution. The
petitioner was convicted of a crime and sentenced to be imprisoned in the
county jail for eight months. The judge then told her that if she would leave
the county and not return, she would not be compelled to serve the sentence,
and directed the clerk not to issue the capias to carry it into effect until fifteen
days after the adjournment of the court. The petitioner left the county, re-
mained away eight months and then returned. She was arrested on the capias
and committed to serve her sentence. A writ of habeas' corpus was denied.
Held, that the judge has the discretionary power to suspend the issue of the
capias. It was not equivalent to a decree of banishment, as the petitioner left
of her own accord and was legally a fugitive from justice. The fact that she
had remained out of the county for eight months was not equivalent to a like
term of imprisonment in the county jail.
TRIAL.
People v. Blevins, Ill., 96 N. E. 214. Appointment of Counsel for Accused.
An indictment for first degree murder was returned against defendant and on
the same day he was arraigned, and having no counsel, the court appointed two
attorneys to defend him. One of these had been in practice less than two
years and the other had given most of his attention to civil cases and had but
little experience in criminal law. At the trial two days later, the regular
state's attorney, the state's attorney of W. County and two other experienced
lawyers appeared for the state. After but three jurors had been accepted, one
of the defendant's counsel moved that the state's attorney of W. County and
the two private attorneys be not permitted to appear and assist in the prosecu-
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tion, showing that defendant's counsel had not had sufficient time to. prepare his
defense, that they had but limited experience in such cases and were greatly
overmatched in experience and practice by counsel appearing for the state, two
of whom had been employed and paid by outside persons for their services, and
that by reason thereof defendant was being oppressed and was in danger of
losing his life or liberty. Held, that while the court may permit private coun-
sel to assist the state's attorney, where there is no oppression of defendant or
injustice to him, the court, under the facts, should have limited the attorneys
assisting the state to one, or should have appointed additional experienced
counsel for accused.
People v. Marks, Ill., 96 N. E. 231. Verdict. The court submitted two
forms of verdict, one for conviction and the other for acquittal, writing the
word "give" on the margin of the form to be used in case of conviction, with-
out making any notation on the margin of the other. Each of the instructions
given also had the same word written on the margin and no direction or ex-
planation was given as to the use of the respective forms of verdict, dependent
on the jury's conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of accused. Held, that
such indorsement was calculated to induce the jury to believe that they should
find the defendant guilty and fill in the blank therein finding the value of the
property alleged to have been stolen and was prejudicial error.
IState v. Davenport, N. Car., 72 S. E. 7. ImproperArgument. The prose-
cuting attorney made an improper argument to the jury. The judge instructed
the jury to disregard it. Held, that the instruction cured the error. If it was
insufficient the defendant should have requested a further instruction. As the
defendants were guilty on the admitted facts, the error was not prejudicial.
Radin et al. v. United States, 189 Fed. 568. Dismissal of Wlitness. Where
none of the testimony of a witness had been material to any issue and he was
being cross-examined on wholly irrelevant matters, it was within the right of
the judge to dismiss him from the stand.
Foster v. United States, 188 Fed. 305. Propriety of Judge Expressing
Opinion. Although the trial judge in a federal court may express an opinion
as to the weight of the evidence in civil cases and as to the guilt of the de-
fendant in criminal cases, yet the greatest caution should be used in the exer-
cise of this power and the jury should be left free and untrammeled in the
determination of questions of fact which are to be passed upon by them; and in
no instance should the judge express an opinion as to the guilt of a defendant
after the case has been submitted to the jury and they have reported their
inability to agree.
Colt v. United States, 19o Fed. 305. Misconduct of Jury. In a prosecu-
tion for using the mails in furtherance of d scheme to defraud, misconduct of
one of the jurors in procuring from the bailiff a copy of the federal statuteq
while the jury were deliberating on a verdict was not ground for a new trial,
where it did not appear that such misconduct influenced the verdict.
People v. Freeian, N. Y., 96 N. E. 413. Improper Conduct of Prosecuting
Attorney. Where accused, charged with larceny by obtaining money by false
representations, was forced, in consequence of the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney in the framing of questions on cross-examination and the admissions
of accused that he had received money from third persons, who were subse-
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
quently called by the prosecution and asked only trivial questions, to submit the
case to the jury under the false impression theteby created that he was guilty
of obtaining by false representations money from such persons, or to enter on
a trial of the issues involving the transactions with such persons, the miscon-
duct of the prosecuting attorney constituted reversible error.
Bohall v. State, Ind., 96 N. E. 576. In a prosecution for homicide, where
the killing was done with a 38-caliber pistol and cartridges to fit it were found
on the accused, the exhibition by the prosecuting officer of smaller cartridges
cannot be complained of for the first time on motion for new trial, where
counsel for accused learned of the mistake before verdict, and the prosecuting
attorney in his concluding argument demonstrated that the cartridges in evi-
den'ce would not fit the pistol.
VERnicr.
People v. McGrath, N. Y., 96 N. E. 92. Motion to Vacate-Withdrawal.
A jury having convicted defendant of murder in the second degree, his counsel
asked the court to reserve motions until the day of sentence. This the court
refused to do, whereupon defendant's counsel, without time for consultation,
made the usual motion to set aside the verdict as against the evidence and on all
the grounds mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court imme-
diately asked the assistant district attorney what he had to say to the motion to
set aside "that" verdict. Before the district attorney had responded, defend-
ant's counsel asked the court to wait a moment, but the court cut him off in the
midst of an unfinished sentence and repeated the question to the 'district attor-
ney, who immediately stated that he did not oppose the motion, when the court
granted the motion. Defendant's counsel then finished what he had previously
started to say, that he would like to withdraw the motion, to which the court
responded that it was too late. Held, that defendant seasonably abandoned his
attempt to destroy the verdict and thit the conviction of murder in the second
degree remained, notwithstanding -such proceedings.
